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though there is widespread agreement that the prevailing rules should go, there
is meager accord on those which should take their place. Much that is proposed
would simply retain the concepts but rearrange the categories.52 It might be
rewarding to explore the possibilities of abolishing the "general"-"special"
damage categories completely, rather than seek to realign them. If by so doing,
attention can be directed to all the facts comprising the injury rather than to
the words alleged to have produced it, then would the law have moved toward
realistic treatment of words intended to damage.

DISCOVERY OF GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS UNDER
THE FEDERAL RULES
The advent of the liberal discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure' has brought in its wake a renewed discussion of an old problem:
when should documents in the possession of the executive departments of the
government be considered privileged from disclosure?? The resolution of this
question involves not only the balancing of the respective rights and needs of
private litigants and the government in its various litigious capacities,3 but
also a delineation of the powers of the executive and the courts in an area where
their duties overlap.4
Law of Defamation, 33 111. L. Rev. 669 (i939); Carr, The English Law of Defamation, i8 L.Q.
Rev. 255, 388 (1902); Donnelly, Law of Defamation-Proposals for Reform, 33 Minn. L. Rev.
6og ('949); Committee on the Law of Defamation: The Porter Report, 12 Modern L. Rev. 217
(i949); Faulks, op. cit. supra note 31.
52 See for examples, Paton, op. cit. supra note 5i; Donnelly, op. cit. supra note 51; Faulks,
op. cit. supra note 31.
1 Rule 34, 28 U.S.C.A. foil. § 2072 (ig5o): "Upon motion of any party showing good cause
therefor ... the court in which an action is pending may (i) order any party to produce and
permit the inspection and copying or photographing... of any designated documents, papers,
books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any of the matters within the scope of the examination permitted... ." Rules 26-32, together with Rule 45 (b) and (d), authorize the issuance
of similar orders to persons not parties to the action; these orders are also subject to the defense of privilege. Park Ridge Corp. v. Elias, 3 F.R.D. 93 (1943). As for the use of other defenses provided by the Rules, in the context of government litigation, see Pike and Fischer,
Discovery against Federal Administrative Agencies, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1125 (1943); to this list
should be added the "work-product" limitation laid down in H1ickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495
(i1947).

For a general discussion of the discovery procedure, see Pike and Willis, Federal Discovery
in Operation, 7 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 297 (194o); Holtzoff, Instruments of Discovery under

Federal Rules, 4i Mich. L. Rev.

205 (1942).

2United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 1, 37, 191 (C.C. Ky., i8o6).
3Recent cases suggest that the treatment of the government's claim of privilege might
depend on whether the government is acting in a sovereign or a proprietary capacity. See
cases cited note 46 infra.
4 See

text at notes I3-I5 infra.
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The government's claim that a document is protected from disclosure by a
particular privilege should be distinguished from the ancient plea of sovereign
immunity, which makes a blanket denial to the application of the discovery
procedure against the government.5 The latter argument, which assumes that
the mechanisms provided in the Federal Rules for compelling disclosure
of documents and information are technically bills of discovery and therefore
may not be used against the sovereign without its consent, 6 has not been accepted by the courts,7 nor seriously urged by the government.
There are a number of distinct and separable privileges which may be invoked to support the government's refusal to produce documents. The privilege
accorded to military secrets s needs no comment. The well-established privilege
of the government not to reveal the identity of "informers"9 finds justification
in the government's receiving information which presumably it could not otherwise obtain."' A similar principle underlies the privilege which protects reports
received by the government from individuals under compulsion of statute."
The foregoing privileges have not caused much controversy, since they are comparatively specific. There are, however, instances not covered by these privileges
where nondisclosure might be justified. In order to fill this gap there has grown
s Even this theory did not preclude all discovery against government agencies, since the
immunity was not always available to officers of the sovereign. Osborn v. Bank of the U.S.,
9 Wheat. (U.S.) 738 (1824); United States v. Lee, io6 U.S. 196 (1882).
6O'Reilly, Discovery against the United States: A New Aspect of Sovereign Immunity?
21 N.C. L. Rev. r (1942).
7 United States v. General Motors Corp., 2 F.R.D. 528 (INI., 1942); cf. Fleming v. Bernardi,
i F.R.D. 624 (Ohio, 1941). The couits' position seems to be justified by the expressed scope
of the Rules: "These rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in all
suits of a civil nature ... with the exceptions stated in Rule 8z" (Rule i). Rule 8i specifies
certain forms of actions which are not governed by the Rules, but makes no exceptions as to
parties. The rule of construction which excludes the sovereign from the operation of any legislative act unless specifically mentioned (Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall.
(U.S.) 227 (z873)) would seem inapplicable here, since the United States is mentioned wherever
an exception is to be made in its favor: Rules 12(a), z3(d), X7(a), 25(d), 37(f), 39(c), 54(d),
55(e), 62(e), 2 Moore, Federal Practice § io5 (2d ed., 1948). Judge Clark has stated that
"where we have felt it necessary we have provided special rules as to the Government....
[I]t was our theory that except as we made special provisions these rules apply to the United
States as a litigant as much as to anyone else." American Bar Association: Proceedings of the
Institute at Washington So (1939). Although this statement might be construed as limiting
the operation of the discovery procedures against the government to those cases where it is a
party to the action, such a distinction seems to be irrelevant to the issue of privilege. See text
at note 41 infra.

sU.S. v. Haugen, 58 F. Supp. 436 (Wash., i944); Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 26 F.
Supp. 583 (N.Y., 1939).
9In re Quarles & Butler, i58 U.S. 532 (x894); Vogel v. Gruaz, iio U.S. 311 (1884).
"oDean Wigmore contends that this particular privilege should cover only the identity of
the informer and not the content of the communication. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2374, at 755.
But see note 44 infra.
11Regulations made pursuant to 26 U.S.C.A. § 55 (i948) prohibit disclosure of individual
income tax returns. O'Connell v. Olsen & Ugelstadt, io F.R.D. 142 (Ohio, 1949).
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which bars disclosure when it would be "prejup a fourth category of privilege,
2
udicial to the public interest.""1
The preliminary question raised by such a claim of privilege is whether the
court or the executive agency asserting the privilege is to make the decision as
to the status of the material in question. In UnitedStates v. Burr,13 the court had
before it the question of whether a subpoena duces tecum could issue to the

President, and whether the entire contents of certain letters in his possession
must be produced on motion and affidavit of the defendant as to their materiality. Chief Justice Marshall stated that the subpoena would issue; and although
he ruled that there was insufficient evidence to decide whether the parts of the
letter in question could be withheld, the discussion makes it clear that he considered the ultimate decision to be in the hands of the court.' 4 It is not surprising that the executive agencies have taken the opposite position, contending
that all discretion as to the need for secrecy rests with the agency asserting the
privilege."S The acquiescence of many courts in this latter view can be seen in
cases involving agency regulations which prohibit any member of the department from disclosing official papers without express authority from the head of
the department, under penalty of fine and discharge from office., 6
12Shallow v. Markert Mfg. Co., 175 Misc. 613, 24 N.Y.S. 2d 823 (i941); cf. Jacoby v.
Delfiner, 183 Misc. 280, 51 N.Y.S. (2d) 478 (1944).
13 25 Fed. Cas. i (C.C. Ky., x8o6).
14 "The president, although subject to the general rules which apply to others, may have
sufficient motives for declining to produce a particular paper, and those motives may be such
as to restrain the court from enforcing its production.... At the same time, the court could
not refuse to pay proper attention to the affidavit of the accused." Ibid., at 191-92.
'S "The courts have repeatedly held that they will not and cannot require the executive to
produce such papers when in the opinion of the executive their production is contrary to the
public interest. The courts have also held that the question whether the production of the
papers would be against the public interest is one for the executive and not for the courts to
determine." 40 Ops. Atty. Gen. 45, 49 (i94r). Of the cases cited by the Attorney General as
authority for this statement, only one, Appeal of Hartranft, 85 Pa. 433 (1877), involved this
issue. Hartranft, the Governor of Pennsylvania, was appealing from an order allowing attachment to issue against him because of his failure to respond to a subpoena directing him to
appear before a grand jury. The court dismissed the order, saying that his appearance would
have been futile since, as governor, he could not be compelled to reveal any information he had
received in the course of his official duties. This proposition was claimed to be a necessary inference from the tri-partite nature of the government: if the executive is to be responsible for
the carrying out of the laws, he must be deemed to have final discretion, as against other
branches of the government, over matters in his department. The dissenting opinion pointed
out that the question of the applicability of the privilege of nondisclosure could have been construed equally well as one falling within the duties of the judiciary.
16These regulations are made pursuant to R.S. § x61 (1878), 5 U.S.C.A. § 22 (x927), which
provides that "the head of each department is authorized to prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the government of his department, the conduct of its officers and
clerks, the distribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use, and preservation of the records, papers, and property appertaining to it." The constitutionality of this
statute, which has been in force since 1789 (r Stat. at Large 28) was affirmed in Ex parte
Curtis, xo6 U.S. 371 (1882). The statute is not a delegation of legislative power, although regulations made pursuant thereto have the force of law. Butler v. White, 83 Fed. 578, 589 (C.C.
Va., x897).
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Privilege against disclosure on the strength of such regulation was first asserted in a line of cases which arose out of a conflict between the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue and some of the state governments. A number of internal
revenue collectors were committed to jail for contempt when they refused to
disclose documents or information relating to the sale of federal tax stamps to
liquor dealers, during the prosecutions of alleged offenders of the state prohibition laws. In all but one case,' 7 the collectors were released on writs of habeas
corpus,' but the courts, anxious not to invite a storm of protest over invasion
of states' rights by the federal judiciary,9 used some very broad language about
the force and limitations of the departmental regulations. In the earliest case
in this group 2 0 the court stated that "Congress has given to the commissioner
of internal revenue, without qualification the power to make and enforce upon
his subordinate officers all reasonable regulations in the matter of the collection
of internal revenue. These regulations are not to be questioned by this court,
but must be upheld and enforced...."2
In Boske v. Comningore,- it was argued that a regulation resulting in a blanket prohibition against disclosure was "inconsistent with law."' 2 The Supreme
Court disposed of this contention with the statement that "[t]here is certainly
no statute which expressly or by necessary implication forbade the adoption
of such a regulation. That being the case, we do not perceive upon what ground
the regulation in question can be regarded as inconsistent with law."24 Since
the statute under which the regulation was promulgated was not intended to
create new rules of evidence/2S the court's reasoning appears to have been based
17In re Hirsch, 74 Fed. 928 (C.C. Conn., i896), upholding the action of the state court.
is In re Weeks, 82 Fed. 729 (D.C. Utah, 1897); Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (Igoo);
In re Lamberton, 124 Fed. 446 (D.C. Ark., 19o3); Stegall v. Thurman, 175 Fed. 813 (D.C. Ga.,
1910); Harwood v. McMurtry, 22 F. Supp. 572 (Ky., 1938).
1"Itis not that the United States has any desire to interfere with or prevent the enforcement of any criminal law which the people of the state may see fit to enact. It is simply a
question whether, when the officers of the state, in attempting to enforce one of her laws seek
to transgress ...what is tantamount to a statute of the United States [see note 2r infra]
it is not the duty of the federal courts... to see to it that the national law is upheld." In re
Huttman, 7o Fed. 699 at 703 (Kan., 1895).
2o

Ibid.

2 Ibid., at 701. At this time the only "regulations" in force were two letters addressed to
individual collectors by the Commissioner. In re HIrsch, 74 Fed. 928, 931 (C.C. Conn., 1896).
-177 U.S. 459 (i900). By this time, a specific prohibition against disclosure had been promulgated and it was conceded that "[i]f these regulations were such as the Secretary could
legally prescribe.., the state authorities were without jurisdiction to compel the Collector
to violate them." Ibid., at 467.
23See note z6 supra.
24 Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 469 (igoo). And a court cannot so find "unless [the
regulation].., is plainly and palpably inconsistent with law." Ibid., at 470.
2s In reviewing the legislative history of the statute, the court in Butler v. White, 83 Fed.
578, 58I (C.C. Va., 1897), said that "it is in no sense a delegated power of legislation. The
evident purpose of congress was to furnish each department with authority to regulate the
conduct of its officers and employees."

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

on the assumption that pre-existing rules of evidence gave the commissioner
complete discretion in this matter, even as against a court.26 No authority was
cited for such an assumption27 and in view of the precedent of United States v.
Burr, the assumption seems questionable.
The issue of whether the court or the executive is to decide questions of
privilege has occasionally been obscured by stating the alternative to executive
discretion in terms of public access to all government records.21 Thus it has been
argued that to allow judicial examination of the material claimed to be privileged would be tantamount to denying all privilege, since such examination
would necessarily involve full disclosure to the world. This dire prediction need
not, and has not, come true, as evidenced by the cases where the court has been
willing to examine the material and safeguard privileged information by
requiring only partial disclosure,29 or disclosure only to the persons immediately
concerned3" or by postponing disclosure until an appropriate time,31 or by not
allowing disclosure at all.32

A more serious criticism of judicial handling of the privilege question is the
fact that the head of an executive agency may have the advantage of a more
complete picture than a court can have of the consequences of disclosure in a
particular case. However, the most sensitive matters of national defense and
law enforcement are to a great degree protected by the specific privileges men26 The decision could have been based on the narrower ground of the privilege of nondisclosure of information given under compulsion of statute. The court mentioned this privilege, but suggested the existence of broader "reasons of public policy" and added, "[a]t any
rate, the Secretary deemed the regulation in question a wise and proper one." Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 470 (I9OO).
27

With the exception of Appeal of Hartranft, 85 Pa. 433 (I877), none has been found.

2SIn re Comingore, 96 Fed. 552, 558 (D.C. IKy., 1899); cf. Appeal of Hartranft, 85 Pa.

433, 444 (1877).
29Walling v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 4 F.R.D. 265 (N.Y., z943); cf. Bowles v. Ackerman, 4 F.R.D. 26o (N.Y., 1945). This has also been done in cases not involving the government, Gordon, Wolf, Cowen Co. v. Independent Halvah Candies, 9 F.R.D. 700 (N.Y., 1949).
30 United States v. Burr,

Fed. Cas. 1,

(C.C. Ky., x8o6); in Evans v. United States,
the court said: "It is not the exclusive right
of any such agency of the Government to decide for itself the privileged nature of such documents, but the court is the one to judge of this when such contention is made. This can be done
by presenting to the judge, without disclosure in the first instance to the other side, whatever
is claimed to have that status. The court then decides whether it is privileged or not." Cf.
United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Committee, 9 F.R.D. 719 (La., 1949), aff'd (by
equally divided court) 18 U.S.L. Week 3297 (Apr. 25, 195o).
25

i8 U. S. L. Week 2573 (D.C. La., June

192

20, 295o),

31 U.S. v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 4 F.R.D. zog (N.Y., 1944). The technique of postponing discovery has been utilized to protect trade secrets in advance of trial, Western States
Machine Co. v. S. S. Hepworth Co., i F.R.D. 766 (N.Y., 194r); whether or not this approach
is feasible may be the determinative factor in ruling on a motion for discovery against the
government in law enforcement cases; see note 44 infra.
32 United States v. Kohler Co., 9 F.R.D. 289 (Pa., 1949); United States v. Deere & Co.,
9 F.R.D. 523 (Minn., 1949).
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tioned above, which have generally been respected by the courts. 33 It should
not be presumed that judicial discretion over other claims of privilege would
produce results "prejudicial to the public interest." On the contrary, where the
courts have assumed the responsibility of examining the claim of privilege,
they have gone out of their way to make sure that "secret" information was not
involved before requiring disclosure of the government. 34 These courts have
recognized that discovery, even under the Federal Rules, is not a matter of
unqualified right,35 and the requests have been denied where the moving party
failed to demonstrate good cause,3 6 and where the court felt that the disadvantages of "harassment... and ... disruption of the organization" would out-

weigh the benefits to be derived from disclosure.37 Although judicial examination of the grounds which are claimed to give rise to the privilege does not guarantee that the proper balance will always be struck between the interests of the
individual litigant and the "public interest," it can serve to counteract a natural propensity on the part of the agencies involved to overestimate the importance of their office procedures and activities when they are judging their own
38
cause.
33 See notes 9-11 supra. In a separate concurring opinion in Bank Line, Ltd. v. United
States, 163 F. 2d 133, 139 (C.A. 2d, 1947), judge Clark suggested that even where the facts
would bring the matter within one of the specific privileges, the court should make a separate
ruling in every case: "During war, courts must respect decisions of the armed forces as to the
need for concealment, but I think no general principle of refusing discovery on a general statement of prejudice to its best interest should be applied to any branch of the government, including the armed forces."
34 In Cresmer v. United States, g F.R.D. 203 (D.C. N.Y., 1949), an action brought under
the Federal Tort Claim Act, 62 Stat. 982 (X948), 28 U.S.C.A. 2671 (ix5o), the government's
assertion of privilege against disclosure was denied by a ruling to the effect that the Act placed
the United States "on a par with ordinary litigants." (It should be noted that in this case the
government was acting in a proprietary capacity; see note 43 infra.) Nevertheless the court,
on its own motion, examined the report in question first, in order "to make sure that.. . fit]
contained no military or service secrets which would be detrimental to the interests of the
armed forces of the United States or to the National Security." 9 F.R.D. 204.
3S U.S. v. 5 Cases, etc., 9 F.R.D. 81 (Conn., 1949); U.S. v. Kohler Co., 9 F.R.D. 289 (Pa.,

1949).
36 "I cannot see the necessity of a court order to enable a claimant to pierce 'the dark veil
of secrecy over pertinent facts' when without an order he can poke his head within the veil
and make his own observation." U.S. v. 5 Cases, etc., 9 F.R.D. 8, 83 (Conn., I949). Cf.
Portland v. Dravo Corp., 4 F.R.D. 3 oS (Pa., 1945).
37 Consolidated Water Power & Paper Co. v. Bowles, io F. 2d 960 (Emerg. App., 1945).
38 Dean Wigmore's description of what he terms typical office procedure where a regulation
prohibiting disclosure is in effect (see note i6 supra) points out the potential danger: "This
general order becomes a routine dogma in the minds of all subordinates. An application now
arrives for a copy of a record material in litigation.... The subordinate at that lowest point,
obsessed by the general dogma against disclosure, prepares a reply denying the application;
he will usually not have the initiative or courage to propose an exceptional use of discretion in
favor of the application. This draft reply is sent up, 'through channels,' each one treating it
in routine fashion, until it reaches the departmental head or other chief officer whose signature
is necessary. Arriving in a ponderous pile of daily draft correspondence, it receives that
necessary signature without further consideration.... Thus, the chief officer himself [who
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The greatest single advantage of allowing judicial inquiry into the government's claims of privilege is the flexibility which appears to be lacking under
the doctrine of executive discretion. There have been a number of instances
under the Rules where disclosure has been required of the government in spite
of an assertion of privilege.9 In many of these cases, however, the disclosure
was ordered on the theory that although the particular agency has sole discretion as to whether disclosure should be permitted when requested in a suit between private parties, the privilege of nondisclosure is automatically waived
when the agency has instituted the action.4O The government is thus faced with
the alternatives of revealing information, the disclosure of which it deems unwise, or abandoning its case, 4' without any judicial determination of the merits
of its claim. This test ignores the question, fundamental to any decision regarding a claim of privilege, of the existence of circumstances extraneous to the
litigation which make it desirable that the material remain confidential.42 In
applying a rule as mechanical as this waiver test, a court is not able to consider
the very important factor of the nature of the capacity in which the government appears in court.
Although justice may require that the government be treated like an ordinary litigant when it is acting in a proprietary capacity,43 additional elements
is usually the only one with power to authorize disclosure] is rarely given an opportunity to
pass intelligently on the precise need for that document in the litigation, or upon the actual
extent to which any important State interest might demand its withholding." 8 Wigmore,
Evidence, § 2378a, at 793. Even if we assume that this condemnation cannot be justifiably
directed at all federal agencies, the existence of this procedure in some cases is not beyond the
realm of possibility.
39 United States v. 3oo Cans, etc., 7 F.R.D. 36 (Ohio, 1947); Bowles v. Ackerman, 4 F.R.D.

260 (N.Y., '945). In Bowles v. Dashiel, 72 F. Supp. 219 (Ore., 1946), an action by the OPA
administrator for damages for over-ceiling prices, the court requested the defendant to file a
motion under Rule 34, requesting documents revealing the basis of the administrator's determinations; presumably the motion was filed and granted. Cf. Bowles v. Karp, 3 F.R.D. 3 27
(KY.,1944 ) 40 Fleming v. Bernardi, i F.R.D. 624 (Ohio, 1941); United States v. General Motors Corp.,
F.R.D. 528 (Ill., 1942). This is sometimes referred to as the "public-private" test; the
terminology can probably be traced to the assertion that "in a suit between private parties"
government papers have a privileged status. z5 Ops. Atty. Gen. 378 (1877).
41 Rule 37(b)(3), 2 U.S.C.A. fol. § 2072 (I95o).

2

42In criminal prosecutions, the government's claim of privilege has often been denied, not
on a theory of waiver, but because "[s]o far as they directly touch the criminal dealings, the
prosecution necessarily ends any confidential character the documents may possess." United
States v. Andolschek, 142 F. 2d 5o3, So6 (C.A. 2d, '944); accord, United States v. Krulewitch, i45 F. 2d 76 (C.A. 2d, I944); United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen (C.A. 7 th, 1950),
18o F. 2d 321. On this basis, it is apparent that these cases cannot be cited as authority for the
waiver theory; but see Bowles v. Ackerman, 4 F.R.D. 26o (NY., 1945).
43 This proposition was adopted in the Federal Tort Claims Act, 62 Stat. 982 (x948), 28
U.S.C.A. 2671 (1950). Apart from such specific statutory language, once a court has accepted
the doctrine of executive discretion, the waiver theory is the only means by which the court
can "logically" refuse to recognize the government's claim of privilege. This has led to some
rather tenuous reasoning in an effort to make a "public" case out of a "private" one in order
to deny the government's privilege. See Zimmerman v. Poindexter, 74 F. Supp. 933 (Hawaii,
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are involved when the government comes into court in its role as a sovereign or
law-enforcing agency. In the latter situation there exist somewhat the same
considerations which underlie the "informers' privilege"; the government
should not be forced to reveal information when the very fact of disclosure
might impede future law-enforcement activities.44 To avoid this by forcing the
government to give up its case is to protect the means at the expense of the goal.
Moreover, it is conceivable that in certain situations, disclosure of the requested
material might entail a premature publication of related investigations or the
revealing of fact-finding techniques which are effective only because they are
kept secret.4s These considerations cannot be given their full effect under pat
notions of waiver; but where the courts follow the practice of judicial examination of the asserted privilege, the implications of the distinction between the
government as a proprietor and as the enforcer of law can be, and have been,
6
recognized.4
It is not unlikely that the doctrine of executive discretion has gained as much
force as it has because of an unwillingness on the part of the courts to face the
enforcement problem which could arise under the opposite view.47 Although
there is some dictum to the effect that a court might use the ordinary remedies
to enforce its orders against the executive branch of the government,48 it is
1947), noted in 58 Yale L.J. 993 (i949). The interdependence of these theories may be inferred from the fact that in a few recent anti-trust prosecutions, where the courts refused to
accept the doctrine of executive discretion and insisted on making their own determination of
the applicability of a privilege, the waiver theory was not even mentioned. "[T]he inevitable
consequence of the Government's submitting itself ... to litigation with private persons" was
not the automatic waiver of all privilege, but the duty to submit the question to the court,
who "then decides whether it is privileged or not." Evans v. United States, i8 U. S. L. Week
2573 (D.C. La., June 20, ig5o). That this procedure need not entail denial of all privilege, see

notes 29-32 supra.
44 The anti-trust prosecutions are an example. The material which is often requested of the
government is that which the government has received from companies that have dealt with
the defendant, regarding the business practices of the latter. United States v. Kohler Co.,
9 F.R.D. 289 (Pa., 1949); United States v. Deere & Co., 9 F.R.D. 523 (Minn., 1949). It is
probable that much of this information is obtained on the strength of the government's practice of keeping such sources confidential; disclosing the documents would probably involve
disclosure of the source. The fact that some of the information contained in the documents
may later be revealed at the trial, or upon pre-trial proceedings, does not warrant complete
disclosure before that time.
4s The denial of discovery in such a case might also be supported by analogy to the reasoning underlying the "work-product" test laid down in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (i947).
46Unitd States v. Deere & Co., 9 F.R.D. 523 (Minn., i949); United States v. Kohler Co.,
9 F.R.D. i89 (Pa., 1949).
4' See Jacoby v. Delfiner, x83 Misc. 280, Sr N.Y.S. (2d) 478 (1944): "an order of the court
directing the United States Department of Justice to furnish plaintiffs with the information
desired need not be honored by that federal agency and, accordingly, the order sought herein
would be a mere futility."
4SIn Thompson v. German Valley R. Co., 22 N.J. Eq. 111 (1871), the court stated, at 11:,
that "[i]t is possible that there may be cases where courts, from the conduct of an Executive,
might deem it proper to proceed against him for contempt."
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"not clear" whether such action would be successful.49 Even if it could be done,
the propriety of such action is debatable. Nevertheless, the weight to be given
to this consideration should not be exaggerated. The problem would arise only
where the government was not a party to the action-in a "private" suitsince otherwise a court can avoid an impasse by resorting to the provisions in
the Rules for entering a default judgment against a disobedient party.3 0 Even
in the former situation it would seem that the natural reluctance of the judiciary and the executive to proceed to the point of open conflict would tend to
make the courts amenable to assertions of privilege when strongly contended
for by the executive, while minimizing the likelihood of the executive's absolute
refusal to produce information which a court has ordered to be disclosed. The
possibility that a court, in a rare case, might have to meet the enforcement
problem unsuccessfully does not seem to be sufficient justification for a court,
in every case, to "abdicatle] an inherent judicial function of determining the
facts upon which the admissibility of evidence in a case depends."s'

PROOF REQUIREMENTS IN ANTI-TRUST SUITS: THE
OBSTACLES TO TREBLE DAMAGE RECOVERY
Some prerequisites for private recovery under the treble-damage provisions
of the anti-trust laws may be considered relatively well settled.' Injury must
be to a "business or property" interest2 and must be "proximately caused ' 3 by
a violation4 of those laws. A creditor, for example, does not suffer a "direct in492 Moore, Federal Practice § 34.05, n. I (ist ed., 1938).
soUnited States v. Cotton Valley Operators Committee, 9 F.R.D. 721 (La., i949), aff'd (by
equally divided court) 18 U. S.L. Week 3297 (Apr. 25, ig5o). It has been suggested that the

public-private test (see text at note 4o supra) may be justified because of this consideration,
Government Privilege against Disclosure of Official Documents, 58 Yale L.J. 993, 998 (I949).
s, Zimmerman v. Poindexter, 74 F. Supp. 933 (Hawaii, 1947).
1Section 7 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 Stat. 209 (i89o), IS U.S.C.A. § IS (194x), is
as follows: "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other person
or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act, may sue
therefor in any circuit court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides
or is found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (i94), IS U.S.C.A. § 15 (I94i), adds only that
'the defendant may be sued in the district in which "he has an agent."
2Glenn Coal Co. v. Dickinson Coal Co., 72 F. 2d 885 (C.A. 4 th, 1934); Louisiana Farmers
P. U. v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 40 F. Supp. 897 (Ark., 1941); American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (igog). "While the antitrust laws are for the public benefit. .an
...action to recover damages is personal.., and not for the benefit of the public. [Plaintiff]
must seek personalpecuniary damages." Maltz v. Sax, 134 F. 2d 2, 5 (C.A.7th, 1943). i Toumlin's Anti-Trust Laws § 20.8 (1949).
3 Package Closure Corp. v. Sealright Co., '41 F. 2d 972 (C.A. 2d, 1944).

4Various activities prohibited by the anti-trust laws have led to recovery of treble damages:
monopolization and conspiracies to monopolize, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Ma-

